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Abstract
We present a model for academia with heterogeneous author types and endogenous
effort to explain changes in the publication process in Economics. We analyze the im-
plications of these developments on research output. Lowering the precision of refer-
eeing signals has a negative impact on able authors but invites more submissions from
less able authors. Increasing the number of journals stimulates less able authors to sub-
mit their papers. The editor can improve the journal’s pool of submitted manuscripts
by improving the precision of refereeing, but not by lowering quality standards. The
submission strategy of an author is informative of his ability.
Keywords: academia, publishing, effort, refereeing, journals.
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1 Introduction
The publication process in Economics has changed significantly in last decades. New jour-
nals emerged, both general interest and field-specific. More authors submit their papers
for publication, and acceptance rates went down significantly. Submitted manuscripits
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increased in length, the number of authors per paper rose, and more time is spent on re-
vising before acceptance. Arguing about the costs and benefits of these changes for the
profession and research quality in general requires understanding how authors’ incen-
tives change.
We propose a model of academia in which authors with heterogeneous abilities decide
whether to submit their research for publication to different journals. The question of who
submits papers constrains the editor, who picks the rule of admission based on perceived
quality of articles. Authors exercise effort to improve the quality of their manuscripts,
which benefits the acceptance chances.
Using our baseline model, we can represent most of the changes on the publication
market mentioned above by varying observable institutional parameters, ranging from
the relative importance of noise in the refereeing process, to increased competition among
journals, to changes in quality standards. We show that our heterogeneous author types
are affected differently by changes in institutional settings, affecting individual effort and
overall research quality. We find that if referees supply noisier reports, it encourages less
able authors to submit their papers to journals for consideration, making the competi-
tion harsher. Increased quality competition among journals increases effort and quality of
papers submitted by more able authors, and decreases quality of manuscripts and effort
exerted by less able authors. The introduction of outside options, such as open-access jour-
nals, decreases the quality of research output. When a general interest journal competes
with a specialized field journal, only the intermediate ability authors find it optimal to
submit their manuscripts to field journals first. Coauthorship might improve the average
paper quality, but only intermediate ability authors collaborate.
The intuition behind many of our results extends immediately to other, more general,
economic decision making environments where an informed principal needs to evalu-
ate projects, followed by binary decisions over acceptance or rejection. Examples include
matrimonial decisions, venture financing, standing for elections and job interviews. Since
we—the authors as well as many of the readers of this paper—are particularly familiar
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with the academic publication market, for illustrative purposes we frame our model in
this specific environment.
Following the literature review, we outline our baseline model, where authors choose
between submitting their paper to a selective journal for a random chance of acceptance,
or sending it off to an unread journal for certain publication. Then we extend our model
to account for the possibility of writing multiple papers, co-authorship and sequential
submission to multiple selective journals. Finally, we outline the informational content of
publication decisions, and conclude with generalizing the context of our findings.
1.1 Literature Review
Since publications are among the most important factors regarding decisions on scientific
development and career-related concerns, a thriving literature on the academic review
process exists. We summarize the main results from this literature below.
Hamermesh (2013) analyzes publication data from the past sixty years. He finds sig-
nificant changes in the methodology of published papers and a substantial increase in the
number of authors per paper. Card and DellaVigna (2013) present a collection of stylized
facts regarding trends in the academic publicationmarket. The authors report that annual
submissions to top journals in economics doubled since the 1970’s but the total number of
articles published in the same journals declined, thereby reducing acceptance rates from
around 15% to 6%. The length of research articles tripled and the number of authors per
paper increased significantly. The authors assert that their insights are consistent with
an increase in quality competition among economists in the past decades. Ellison (2002)
investigates trends in the academic review process and finds a substantial slowdown in
turnaround times in the past 30 to 40 years (from 6months to about 24 months) in top eco-
nomic journals. He concludes that most of the slowdown is generated by shifts in social
norms and increased quality competition. Ellison (2011) stresses the impact of “outside”
options such as the internet or open access journals on the refereeing and publication pro-
cess, suggesting that the role of journals in disseminating research has been reduced. His
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results indicate that the existence of outside options decreases the attractiveness of high
end authors to go through the peer review process.
The following empirical results are generally agreeable.
Editors are active Laband (1990) analyzes the editorial decision making process in five
top economics journals. While editors are found to be concerned with maintaining and
improving the quality of papers published in their journals, he also finds that the screen-
ing process is by and large inefficient. Laband and Piette (1994) investigate the impact
of editorial favoritism on the publication process. They find that favoritism may increase
efficiency, but it also increases the variance in quality of published articles.1
Referees screen In Laband (1990), more frequently cited papers tend to have longer
referee reports. Hamermesh (1994) presents various stylized facts about the refereeing
process in economics such as matching of well known authors to better referees (positive
sorting) and the general slowdown in the submission-acceptance times in top economic
journals. He also finds that monetary incentives may speed up the review process. Azar
(2005) focuses on first response times of journals and suggests that the observed slowdown
in first-round-turnaround times could be socially beneficial, since effort costs of referees
could have increased over time. Welch (2014) estimates the noise part in the referees’
signals to be about twice as large as the common part.
Author identity matters Blank (1991) compares single- versus double-blind peer re-
view systems via a randomized experiment using manuscripts submitted to the American
Economic Review. Acceptance rates are lower for almost all researchers except researchers
from top-5 departments (who arguably are harder to anonymize), and reviewers are less
constructive under a presumably more noisy double-blind peer review system. The de-
cline in acceptance rate is strongest for authors from mid-ranked economic departments.
Bornmann (2011) provides a large-scope overview over academic refereeing processes,
finding mixed evidence of a gender bias.
1Medoff (2003) argues that connected authors choose to publish their better papers where their friends
are editors.
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Many relevant theoretical contributions are related to incentives in refereeing. Engers
and Gans (1998) show that, when referees care about the journal’s quality, monetary in-
centives may speed up refereeing, but might slower the process of finding referees; this
reduces efficiency and lowers journal quality. Chang and Lai (2001) on the other hand
show that it might be optimal for editors to incentivize referees in equilibrium if the ref-
erees gain reputation from the refereeing activity itself. Their results imply that higher
quality journals find it less difficult to recruit referees and may maintain their quality ad-
vantage.
Author incentives were studied, too. Leslie (2005) shows that submission fees and
slow turnaround times at high quality journals can increase journal quality by discour-
aging “long-shot submissions”, and Cotton (2013) introduces author heterogeneity with
respect to sensitivity to these tools in order to warrant the equilibirum usage of both. Atal
(2010) derives conditions under which competition among journals lowers quality cutoffs
for publications. Similarly, Barbos (2014) shows that two-sided informational incomplete-
ness from the perspectives of editors and authors may lead to a quantitative decrease in
submitted papers.2 Oster (1980) and Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009) study the optimal
submission sequence: the former is concerned with trading off faster publication with
larger prestige, whereas the latter extend the results to risk-aversion.
2 One Good Journal Model
The academia consists of the authors who submit their papers to the editor for publication.
There is a continuum of authors of measure 1. Authors are heterogeneous with respect
to their abilities θ: a paper produced by an author of type θ has innate quality θ. θ is
distributed with a cdf G(·) and a continuous strictly positive pdf of g(·) continuously on
(−∞,+∞). Authors can spend effort e to boost their paper quality up to q = θ+ e, paying
2Barbos (2014) investigates “project” submissions from amore general perspective, but the adaptation of
the problem into the academic publishing process is straightforward. All intuition from our results in the
publication framework retain in this more general “project” submission framework.
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costs c(e). The effort cost function is twice continuously differentiable, strictly convex and
negligible at zero: c′′(e) > 0, c(0) = 0 and c′(0) = 0.
The editor has discretion over papers to admit to the journal which has capacity T .
The editor would like to fill the journal with the best available papers, but the editor can
only observe the quality of papers supplied to her with noise. That is, upon sending the
paper of quality q to referees for evaluation, the editor receives a signal of q˜ = q + αε,
where α is a positive parameter representing the comparative importance of noise in the
referees’ evaluations, and ε is the paper-specific noise, distributed with cdf F (·), and pdf
f(·), positive on full support3 (−∞,+∞).
The editor’s problem is then to choose which papers to publish after obtaining signals.
She will use a cutoff rule: a paper is accepted for publication if q˜ > qˆ.
The author’s problem is twofold. Authors can attempt to submit their paper to the
journal that has an audience (just journal hereafter). If the paper is accepted, the author
scores 1 publication; normalize the utility of this outcome to 1. If the paper is getting
rejected, the author can send it to an all-accepting journal that has no readers (bad journal
hereafter), and collect δu¯ < 1 of reservation utility, where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the time discounting
costs, and u¯ ∈ [0, 1) is the payoff from having one more line in a CV. Alternatively, the
author can send his paper to the bad journal immediately, and harvest u¯ of utility. Thus,
the author who attempts submission will choose effort based on maximizing
P (θ + e+ αε > qˆ) + (P (θ + e+ αε ≤ qˆ)) δu¯− c(e) = 1−
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[1− δu¯]F
(
qˆ − θ − e
α
)
− c(e).
The (pure strategy) equilibrium is a collection of the paper quality cutoff level qˆ; the
author self-selection cutoff level θˆ; and the authors’ effort choice level e∗(θ) such that
• the paper quality cutoff level qˆ admits exactly T papers to the journal:
∫ +∞
θˆ
[
1− F
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)]
g(θ)dθ = T.
3Results extend if errors have bounded support.
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• e∗(θ) solves the Effort Choice Problem of the author whose ability is θ ≥ θˆ:
e∗(θ) = argmax
e
{
1− [1− δu¯]F
(
qˆ − θ − e
α
)
− c(e)
}
.
• the author self-selection cutoff level θˆ is such that only authors of θ > θˆ find it optimal
to submit their papers:
1− [1− δu¯]F
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
− c(e∗(θ)) ≥ u¯ iff θ ≥ θˆ.
By monotonicity of best responses there exists a unique equilibrium as defined above.
2.1 Effort Choice Problem
Consider an authorwith ability level θwho chooses effort level e. The first-order condition
of this problem is
1− δu¯
α
f
(
qˆ − θ − e
α
)
= c′(e). (1)
The second-order condition is
−1− δu¯
α2
f ′
(
qˆ − θ − e
α
)
− c′′(e) < 0. (2)
Even very large e cannot provide more than 1 unit of total utility, and for big enough e,
c(e) > 1 by strict concavity. Moreover, since f(·) > 0 and c′(0) = 0, zero effort is always
suboptimal. Therefore, the effort choice is finite and upper hemicontinuous.
f(·) is single-peaked whenever f(·) is log-concave, which is a common assumption for
“noise” in Economics. This is not a necessary assumption for the following results, but it is
a useful property that allows a concise characterization of many results. Every density can
be thought of as a single-peaked density with disturbances in the middle of the support.
Assumption 1. f(·) is single-peaked, with peak at 0, and ε has a finite mean.
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εMB(e)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− δu¯
α
f(·)
qˆ − θ qˆ
MC(e)︷︸︸︷
c′(·)
qˆ − θ − e
(a) Marginal Benefit of Effort
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(b) Large θ
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(c) Small θ
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
A
B
C
(d) Multiple Intersections
Note: On Figures 1b–1d, the intersection of solid marginal benefit (MB) lines and dashed marginal cost (MC) lines represent the amount of effort chosen by authors of various
levels of θ. Dotted lines represent the change of the marginal benefit due to an increase in θ.
Figure 1: Optimal Effort Choice
Result 1. If f(·) is single-peaked, e∗(θ) is single-peaked.4
e∗() is single-valued for almost every θ, and so it is continuous almost everywhere.
Many results discussed below hold even if e∗(θ) is multi-valued, as in Figure 1d, including
the following one.
Proposition 1. The quality of the submitted paper, θ + e∗(θ), is increasing in type θ.
2.2 Author’s Best Response and Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we analyze the effects of changes in variables that are exogenous to an
author’s problem. The following result analyzes the effect of increased quality standards.
Result 2. For almost every θ, an increase in qˆ increases the effort level of more able submitters and
decreases the effort level of less able submitters. The utility of all authors decreases.
Since it gets harder to publish, those who have good chances of publication find it
optimal to spend more effort to overcome the marginally higher hurdle, whereas those
who have lower chances of publication give up.
4One can show that the maximum effort is exercised by an agent who writes a paper of a strictly lower
quality than qˆ because of the strict convexity of the cost function.
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Result 3. For almost every θ, an increase in u¯ or δ decreases the effort level and increases the
utility of those who submit. More authors submit their papers if δ increases, and fewer authors
submit papers if u¯ increases.
If the bad journal starts being more attractive, it cannot decrease the utility of authors.
A higher payoff associated with a publication in the bad journal limits the losses if the
paper is not accepted, making spending effort less attractive. If we had the submission fee
explicitly modeled, it would not increase the benefits of publication directly, and hence
would not affect the effort, but it would lower the participation of authors.
Even without heterogeneity with respect to comparative acuteness of monetary versus
time costs (á la Cotton, 2013), the difference in the effects of time and monetary costs on
the endogenous effort and the participation rate can create variance in the application of
the two across disciplines simply from the difference in the relative importance of effort
and submission pool size for different disciplines.
2.3 Refereeing Quality
Let us denote θ0 to be the value of θ such that the quality of the paper written by an author
with θ = θ0 is exactly qˆ:
θ0 : qˆ = θ0 + e
∗(θ0).
This author publishes his paper if and only if his ε > 0.
Proposition 2. For almost every θ, an increase in α lowers the effort level for authors in the neigh-
borhood of θ0, and increases the effort of those whose ability is high enough or low enough. The
chance of publication increases for highly able authors and for authors of low ability, and decreases
for authors with θ in the neighborhood of θ0. The utility from submitting the paper decreases for
able authors (θ > θ0), and increases for less able authors.
The economic reasoning behind the effect mentioned in the previous proposition is
straightforward. When the noiseness of referees’ evaluations increases, authors with very
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εMB(e)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− δu¯
α
f(·)
qˆ − θ qˆ
MC(e)︷︸︸︷
c′(·)
qˆ − θ − e
(a) Marginal Benefit of Effort
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(b) Large θ
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(c) Intermediate θ
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(d) Low θ
Note: On Figures 2b–2d, the intersection of the solid Marginal Benefit (MB) line and the dashed marginal cost (MC) line represents the effort choice for for the different values of
θ. Dotted lines represent the change of the marginal benefit (MB) due to an increase in α.
Figure 2: Change in Effort due to Change in Refereeing Quality
low abilities face a higher chance of acceptance due to an increase in Type I errors: referees
might provide very favorable reports to inferior papers, and the editor might publish their
paper even if it was not very well written. These authors, simultaneously, do not exercise
a lot of effort, and the marginal cost of effort for them is small. On the other hand, authors
with very high θ face a higher chance of Type II error, and they increase their effort be-
cause their marginal cost of effort is small, because they don’t apply much effort as well.
Only authors of papers with quality approximately equal to the editor’s imposed thresh-
old decrease their efforts: their chances of Type I and Type II errors are relatively similar,
though larger in absolute value. The marginal product of effort is smaller, because the
same amount of extra effort compensates less noise, which leads to lower choice of effort.
Worse quality of refereeing does not have to be necessarily bad for the effort of authors,
some authors might find it optimal to increase the efforts. The authors that increase their
efforts, however, are away from the neighborhood of the mode of f(·), and therefore it is
likely that most authors will lower their efforts. In any case, increasing α makes submis-
sion a better opportunity for less able authors, and aworse opportunity for authors whose
work is above threshold.
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This change in the behavior of individual authorswill have consequences for the editor.
If the threshold qˆ was such that all submitters with θ > θˆ had also θ > θ0, the increase in
α will lower the quantity of submissions, and the journal would have unused capacity,
which would call for lowering qˆ. This will lower the effort of those who submit. On the
other hand, if the threshold qˆ was less than θ0 + e∗(θ0), the increase in α will make the
threshold author’s utility from submission strictly higher than u¯, and thus less able authors
would find it optimal to submit. Thus, more papers than T would be above the acceptable
threshold. In both cases, the average quality of submissions can easily deteriorate.
This provides a potential explanation for why referees, many of which are prominent
faculty with significant opportunity costs of foregone consulting, work on referee reports
even though their pecuniary payoff from refereeing is meager. Worsening quality of ref-
eree reports hurts able authors in equilibrium, and referees in Economics journals are
sophisticated enough to acknowledge this indirect effect. If this is not sufficient, demoti-
vating less able authors from attempting submission will lower the amount of reviewing
to do.
In the following extensions we will set α equal to 1 until we’ll need it back.
3 Extensions
3.1 Two Good Journals, One Paper
Assume that, instead of one good journal, there are two good journals, indexed by 1 and 2,
with a joint capacity of T .5 Both editors are equally capable, and the refereeing technology
in both journals is the same.
Same journals Assume the publication in either journal yields 1 unit of utility to the
author. Assume the editors apply the same standard θˆ, the same they would use were
they in the equilibrium with one journal, providing similar chances for publication for
5Retaining the same capacity allows to separate the effects of the increase of capacity from the effect of
havingmore alternatives, which follows immediately from Result 2 via recognizing that higher capacity can
only lower the admission standards.
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the paper of quality q. Therefore, the only difference with the previous scenario is the
possibility of resubmission.6 Would the outcome discussed in Section 2 remain?
The authors submit papers to one of the journals for review; we will discuss simulta-
neous submissions later. If the editor of the chosen journal chooses to reject the paper,
the paper is resubmitted7 to another journal. We assume that editors are honest, and do
not treat first- and second submissions differently (for instance, always rejecting all papers
which were not submitted to their journals as a first choice): after all, the editors know the
authors are indifferent between two journals.8 Rejection however is an informative signal,
and editors would like to know about it, but since it’s an unfavorable signal, authors do
not, in practice, advertise prior rejections in cover letters. The editor in our two-period
model can learn that the paper was once rejected by looking at the calendar, but real-life
editors do not have a perfect signal about the quantity of prior rejections, and can only
infer it from the relative rank of their journal: similarly ranked journals are likely to face
similar journal quality distributions in time.
The author who submits to journal 1, and then to journal 2, chooses the effort to max-
imize
1− F (qˆ − θ − e) + F (qˆ − θ − e)δ (1− F (qˆ − θ − e) + F (qˆ − θ − e)δu¯)− c(e).
The author then compares the expected value with the outside option u¯, and submits the
paper if the former is larger. The author’s application decision changes insignificantly:
6This makes authors indifferent between two journals. However, in equilibrium, the average quality of
published papers in two journals might be different if the amount of authors who aim at journal i is not
proportional to the capacity of journal i.
7We omit the possibility of the interim revision, since by assumption, authors know the type of their
papers, and can learn nothing from referee reports. The authors have no uncertainty about acceptance
thresholds either. Inability to invest or disinvest efforts in between can be relaxed to obtain additional effects
on effort allocation in time.
8Naturally, if the noise about the paper quality ε was correlated across journals, the rejection in another
journal would be informative. We, however, want to minimize the change between the behavior of one
editor and two editors, to concentrate on the effects that arize simply from two submission options instead
of one. Having lower standard for those who submit as a first choice, compensated by a higher standard for
the resubmitters, can encourage some of the authors, and prevent some resubmissions, lowering the referee
load, but can admit papers of worse quality.
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each author will either submit to one journal, and after rejection to another, or not submit
at all. All publishing authors are strictly better off in the world with two journals, which
implies that more authors will submit papers.
The author’s effort choice problem changes, too. We will retain e∗(·) to denote the
optimal effort choice. The new first-order condition is
(1− δ + 2δF (qˆ − θ − e)[1− δu¯]) f (qˆ − θ − e) = c′(e). (1’)
Proposition 1 remains valid: the quality of a paper increases with ability. This mono-
tonicity result is helpful in characterizing the change in effort.
Result 4. Comparing the one-journal academia with the two-journal academia, in the latter, effort
is higher for low-θ authors and lower for high-θ authors.
From the point of view of the authors, the referees’ opinion is now skewed to the right:
even if the author gets an unfortunate review in the first round, his paper fails only if both
reviews are unfortunate. Only authors with a small probability of publication might get
motivated to exercisemore effort. Therefore, the editors cannot, in general, retain the same
cutoff as in the equilibrium with just one good journal. Since every author who found it
optimal to submit his paper originally will still find it optimal to submit his paper when
he has a chance to resubmit to another good journal, there will be more total submissions,
and the admission cutoff is likely to go up.
The symmetric threshold equilibrium is not trembling-hand perfect: if the editor of
journal 2 by chance picks a somewhat smaller admission threshold, authors would be
delighted to submit to journal 2 first. The most important consequence of this outcome
is that journal 2 would have a better distribution of papers under consideration: after all,
journal 1 will only get papers that were rejected by the referees of journal 2. This will affect
the readership, the refereeing load in both journals, and the reward from publication.
Therefore, when there are two journals, they are likely to be different.
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Different Journals Assume that a publication in journal 1 yields 1 unit of utility to
an author, and a publication in journal 2 yields γ < 1 utility. The expected payoff of an
author who submits to journal 1 first, and to journal 2 afterwards, is then
1− F (qˆ1 − θ − e) + F (qˆ1 − θ − e)δ (γ (1− F (qˆ2 − θ − e)) + F (qˆ2 − θ − e)δu¯)− c(e).
If editors apply the same standard qˆ = qˆ1 = qˆ2, providing same chances for publication
for an author whose paper quality is q, if a paper is worth submitting to journal 2, it is
worth submitting to journal 1. The reverse is not true.
Result 5. The optimal submission strategy is to submit to journal 1, then to journal 2 if γ is
significantly higher than u¯.
Lower θ needs higher γ for resubmission. Sincewe assume that ε is uncorrelated across
journals, a new small but demanding journal with low payoff of acceptance can, in fact,
obtain a better average quality of published papers than the equally demanding more
prominent old journal. True, the new journal’s submissions will consist only of the rejec-
tions of the old journal, but the support of submitters to the new journal will be narrower:
authors of relatively low ability will abstain from resubmission of their rejected papers.
Lowering the admission standards will not help to attract able authors.
Proposition 3. When f(·) is log-concave, and journal 2 has lower admission standard, only au-
thors with low ability will submit to journal 2 first.
Field Journals To illustrate the decisionmaking in submissions and resubmissions to
a field journal, we will modify the different journals framework to represent the journal’s
specialization. The referees in the journal are frequently authors in the same journal. At
best, the editor in a general interest journal can provide an author with the same match
of referees as in a specialized journal, but this is not in the interest of the general interest
journal’s editor: this editor wants the paper to be understandable and interesting for a
general audience. Therefore, the referees’ noiseness in the field journal α2 = α is less than
14
θu1(θ)
u2(θ)
(a) α < 1, γ = 1
θ
u1(θ)
u2(θ)
(b) α < 1, γ < 1
θ
u1(θ)
u2(θ)
(c) α = 1, γ < 1
Note: ui(θ) is the utility of submitting first to journal i. Figure 3a represents the intuition of Proposition 2, Figure 3c represents the intuition of Result 5, Figure 3b shows what
changes in Figure 3a in γ becomes slightly less than 1..
Figure 3: Field Journals as First Choice
in the first journal: α1 = 1 > α. We will assume that the admission thresholds are the
same9.
Since the decrease in referees’ noiseness improves the utility of submitters, able authors
might be more interested in submitting their papers to field journals. However, since the
payoff from publishing a paper in a field journal might be lower than from publishing the
same paper in a general interest journal (because the readership is lower, or because the
tenure committee thinks so), the most able authors, whose papers get published with a
probability close to 1, would prefer a general interest journal. For less able authors, lowerα
is a deterrent for submission, so both effects, noiseness and payoff, discourage publication.
Proposition 4. Among those who submit to both journals sequentially, if an author prefers to
submit first to the field journal, this author’s ability is neither extremely high nor extremely low.
Such authors exist if the change in γ is not large compared to the change in α.
Submitting to only one journal, or not submitting at all, might be an even better strat-
egy, but, when α is in the neighborhood of 1, one can invoke Result 5 to rule out single-
journal strategies.
Simultaneous Submission In Economics, most journals explicitly require authors to
claim that the article has not been submitted to other journals. In other areas of science,
such as Law, this is not so. Based on our model, switching to simultaneous submissions,
as the first-order effect, will lower the time costs of the authors (more so if δ is further away
from 1, or if the probability of acceptance in the first choice journal is low), and all authors
would prefer to do simultaneous submissions, all else being equal. At the same time, the
9Bardhan (2003) was the source for our intuition.
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editors will face competition for the best papers, enforcing lower turnaround times and
competing for the readership.
However, lowering the effective time costs will also lower the authors’ efforts, and will
increase the referees’ load—under sequential submission, all papers accepted in the first
journal, are not considered by referees in the second journal. This might not translate
into reading each paper twice, since some referees of the first journal might get the same
paper to referee for the second journal. Unless editors coordinate perfectly, simultaneous
submission will increase the referees’ load. The overall payoff for the profession does not
have to be higher as a result.10
3.2 Two Papers, One Journal
Many scholars, including the authors of this study, author more than one paper simul-
taneously. This allows them to apply their innate ability more than once per period, but
requires spending more of total effort. This can be interpreted positively (the simulta-
neously incepted papers do not have to be about the same topic) or negatively (salami
slicing). Let us model the choice to author two papers simultaneously by postulating the
payoff from writing two papers, spending e of effort per paper, to be11
2 (1− (1− δu¯)F (qˆ − θ − e))− c(2e),
where we put in an implicit assumption that submitting two papers of equal quality pro-
vides a higher expected utility than submitting one paper of high quality and another of
quality θ. This is true when 1−F (−x) is a concave function of x, which should hold when
x is high, since f(−x) has to decrease eventually, so that ∫ +∞−∞ f(x) dx has to be equal to
1. That is, able authors, of high θ + e, are likely to split their efforts equally. In the same
10There are other effects detrimental to the overall quality of the papers beyond the scope of our study
(revision between submission rounds could be useful; the author might want to wait for the replies of all
journals to pick the best, which increases the publication time; and so on).
11The implicit assumption here is that writing two papers and sending them to a bad journal yields 2u¯ of
utility. In case of salami slicing, the utility of having two identical papers unpublished is at most u¯.
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eMB(e)
MB(e/2)
MC(e)
MC(2e)
AC B
(a) Large θ
e
MB(e)
MB(e/2)
MC(e)
MC(2e)
AC B
(b) Small θ
Note: PointA represents the effort choice of writing a single paper. PointB represents the total effort when writing two papers, pointC represents the effort per paper.
Figure 4: Effort when Writing Two Papers
spirit, authors whose θ+ e is small are facing a locally convex 1−F (−x). If this convexity
is not dominated by the convexity of c(e), the less able authors might want to submit two
papers: one with a quality as if they were submitting only one paper, and another of qual-
ity θ. If these authors submit one paper, they will submit two: the second paper comes
with no effort attached. This is also strictly better than submitting only one paper if u¯ is
small enough.
The first-order condition that characterizes e∗2(θ), the effort choice when submitting
two papers, is
[1− δu¯]f(qˆ − θ − e) = c′(2e). (3)
It is immediate to establish themonotonicity of θ+e∗(θ) and single-peakedness of e∗(θ)
for single-peaked f(·).
Result 6. For almost every θ, authors who submit two papers spend less effort per paper than
they would if they submitted only one paper. The total effort spent on papers increases if θ is large
enough, and decreases if θ is small enough.
Effectively, if authors write multiple papers, from the point of view of the editor, it
is as if there were more of authors, each exercising less effort because per-paper effort
is costlier. Which authors prefer to submit a single paper, and which authors prefer to
submit multiple papers?
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The able authors, whose θ permits them to hope for high chance of acceptance, will
submit two papers, harvesting more than 1 in total expected payoff. The less able authors
might find it optimal to submit only one paper, spend all effort on it, and write the second
one for the bad journal. The total submissions will increase, there will be more papers,
so the right tail of the distribution paper quality might improve. The editor will have
to either increase the acceptance standard or to increase the journal’s capacity. The first
method will discourage submissions from the less able authors, but will, in general, hurt
the utility of authors, especially of those who author a single paper. The second method
of handling paper proliferation will increase the referee load.
3.3 Coauthorship
Many scholars, including the authors of this study, coauthor papers. They benefit from
combining their different backgrounds, sharing their erudition and specializing in tasks.
The single-dimensional ability model that we have can be extended to the decision of col-
laboration: we will assume that two coauthors sacrifice their independent research pur-
suits and morph into a single fictitious author. Let the productivity of a collaboration of
two authors with abilities θ1 and θ2 be Θ(θ1, θ2), increasing in θi. Then each author will
be interested in pairing with a better coauthor. If the matching process is perfect12, the
coauthors will be of equal ability, and their ability will be Θ(θ, θ). We will shut down the
channel of the relative efficiency improvement, and assume that Θ(θ, θ) = θ; if not, and
Θ(θ, θ) > θ, this makes collaboration more attractive, since Proposition 1 applies.
The allocation of credit for coauthored papers is an issue in itself. Some credit an au-
thor of a paper with N coauthors with 1/N of credit, some argue that having coauthors is
12An extension with an imperfect matching process is straightforward and will need additional assump-
tions. For instance, the collaboration of the junior faculty member and a well-established professor, unlike
our simpler perfect matching, is quite frequent, but so much richer strategically, that it cannot be contained
in a short extension andwarrants a separate study. Uneven sharing of both effort and credit will go part and
parcel with a layer of reputation building, and all these considerations are complementary to our current
model.
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Note: On Figures 5a–5b, dotted lines represent the change of the marginal benefit due to an introduction of γ and a decrease of per-person marginal costs of total effort. The total
effort is higher in collaboration (A > B, both subfigures), but the per-person effort can decrease if θ is large (A > C on Figure 5a, but not on Figure 5b) or if γ is too small
(A > C′ , both subfigures).
Figure 5: Effort under Coauthorship
not a reason to discount publications.13 Here we will assume that each of two coauthors
obtains the credit of γ ≤ 1 single-authored papers.
Let the effort of two coauthors be expected to be equal. Then the cost of coauthorship
is 2c(e/2), and the fictitious author14 maximizes
max
e
2γ (1− [1− δu¯]F (qˆ − θ − e))− 2c(e/2).
This utility is split equally between two authors. Denote e∗∗(θ) to be the effort choice
for the collaboration problem; analogously to Proposition 1, θ + e∗∗(θ) is increasing.
Result 7. Effort in coauthored papers is higher for all authors when γ = 1. As γ decreases, all
coauthors exercise less effort.
Easier effort motivates those with little chances of success by themselves, but allows
most able authors to give up some efforts.
Result 8. For γ = 1, collaborative effort per person is higher than in solo authoring for low-ability
authors, and lower for high-ability authors.
13Bikard et al. (2013) estimates the weight to be more corresponding to 1/√N than other alternatives.
14This is the first-best effort allocation outcome. We abstain from thediscussions of free-riding equilibrium
outcomes, and we abstain from discussions of how would the results change ifN agents were collaborating
simultaneously, for brevity.
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When γ is less than 1, highly-able authors, whose probability of solo publication is close
to γ without any efforts, prefer to publish solo: the collaboration-penalty is detrimental to
their effort saving benefits.
Result 9. For almost every θ, there is a small enough γ > 0 that will make collaboration less
attractive than solo authorship.
Since c′(·) is an arbitrary increasing function, we cannot further establish the pattern
of collaboration when γ < 1 without loss of generality. We can, however, attempt to char-
acterize what happens with comparative tendency to collaborate as θ → −∞, which does
not have to have a positive mass in the population of authors.
Result 10. If γ < 1/2, least able authors prefer to work solo.
The cutoff 1
2
in the previous Result is a sufficient, not a necessary boundary. Partic-
ularly, such a low γ will drive the total collaborative productivity below the individual
productivity for low enough θ. The proof would still work if γ was chosen so that per
person collaborative productivity was driven below the individual productivity.
The low-ability authors, even if they submit, might not experience a sufficient economy
of effort costs to warrant a higher choice of effort: they chose low effort because they could
not hope for a decent chance to publish their work, and they still cannot. Furthermore,
their publication will yield only γ of the solo publication. Thus, the intermediate ability
agents are the most likely collaborators.
The total quantity of submissions can decrease if some of the collaborating authors
would otherwise submit solo, but might increase if the set of potential collaborators in-
cludes the indifferent author type. The average quality of submitted and published pa-
pers, net of entry, will increase; the proportion of rejections, net of entry, might decrease,
because the total effort onmulti-author papers is higher, and therefore the quality of high-
quality papers might increase.
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3.4 Feedback from Refereeing
Referees of journals are frequently authors of papers published in the very same journals.
Many factors affect their efficiency; a few interact with the submission outcomes.
The referee load, which is related to the amount of submissions, is unlikely to improve
the referee’s efficiency. The increase in workload, holding the quality of work constant,
will make the time to finish work longer, and the maintenance of the same referee report
deadline times will decrease the quality of reports. As with any tradeoffs, most likely a
small worsening in both dimensions is going to be optimal. Every Result that leads to
the increase of submissions is then likely to increase the noiseness of referee reports α, or
to increase the time costs. Some results are reinforced by this feedback. For instance, an
exogenous increase in α leads tomore submissions (see Proposition 2), whichwill increase
the load to referees.
Thewriting of referee reports and thewriting of the original research is likely to involve
similar human resources. Therefore, a highermarginal cost of the authoring effort is likely
to increase the marginal cost of refereeing effort.
The most mysterious part of the refereeing process is the motivation of referees to pro-
duce informative signals. Our model provides an indirect explanation: able authors are
hurt by a decrease in refereeing quality, and less able authors start to submit. Since most
able authors can recognize the value in contributing to a public good (or at least in de-
motivating less able authors from submitting), they could be motivated to provide the
refereeing services for free even if they don’t explicitly care about the journal’s quality.
3.5 Editor’s Opinions
Editors are frequently prominent scholars themselves, and can formulate their own opin-
ion about the paper before sending it off to the referees. Any ex ante positive signals will
make the editor more welcoming. In the context of the model, getting a positive signal
about a paper in addition to the referee’s signal will move the admission threshold down.
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The editor can use the ex ante signal to decide on whether to send the paper to referees for
additional evaluation. If the editor cares about the quantity of referee reports (for instance,
because overloaded referees cannot work as quickly), this creates a strategy space for the
editor: only papers of intermediary quality will be sent to referees for the signal refine-
ment, a high independent signal about the paper quality might qualify for desk accept,
and a low independent quality signal can lead to a desk reject.15
Some signals of the editor might be public information. For instance, author’s affil-
iation is well-known or easily obtainable, and arguably informative about the author’s
ability, and, consequently, about the quality of the author’s paper. This will discourage
authors with high independent signals from exercising effort: after all, they know that
the editor will treat them favorably. This might discourage able authors with unfavorable
public signals from submission. An affirmative action policy, with lower admission stan-
dard for authors of worse publication record, might induce higher effort among both low
ability authors with unfortunate signals and high-ability authors with strong signals. Past
publication record is another example of public information signaling, and some authors
would rather not publish a paper in a second-tier journal after a rejection from the first-tier
journal to ease their future publication chances, with disastrous consequences for tenure.
Blind refereeing, even though impossible to implement perfectly due to the existence of
Google, is still followed by many journals, and this might well be the reason.
4 Discussion
4.1 Policy Implications
Every policy implication will need, besides a good understanding of the authors’ motiva-
tion, the understanding of the public benefit from publications, the understanding of the
15Too low precision of the independent signal might worsen the journal’s performance compared to the
journal whose editor has no independent signals: able authors will flock to the journals with less chances
of random desk rejections, and unable authors will be attracted by the perspective of getting their papers
desk-accepted, even if they stand little chance after the referee review.
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editors’motivation, and the understanding of the payoff of the author from the publication
(currently normalized to 1). The editor is concerned with better readership; the society is
interested in better research quality; the author is interested in signaling his own ability
and disseminating his own ideas. Every change in the market for publications affects the
components of society’s, editor’s and author’s welfare differently. The amount of submis-
sions, the amount of refereeing, the efforts and ability of differently able authors accepted
for publication: stronger results can be establishedwith a better understanding about how
these factors contribute to the society, to the editor and to the author. For instance, the ed-
itor that maximizes the average ability of his authors, without any regard for the benefit
to society, can set an extremely high publishing standard: she can publish one paper in
10 years, but be sure that the average ability is arbitrarily high. The author probably cares
less about the referee load than the editor. We, however, can make some statements about
how the components of society, the editor, and the author’s welfare changes.
More Open-Sourced Journals Many authors (e.g. Bergstrom (2001)) call for more
open-sourced journals, to increase competitionwith for-profit journals, tomotivate shorter
refereeing delays or to drive down the fees for libraries. Assuming that new journals will
recruit the necessary editorial reviewing resources, they will be in the situation of second-
but-same journal, discussed above: the effort level of the most able authors will decrease,
the amount of submissions will increase, and higher total capacity will drive down publi-
cation standards. Even if publication standards remain unchanged, having more journals
lowers research effort. To attract the best authors, new journals should generate higher
payoffs from publication than for-profit journals. Without that, or sabotaging old jour-
nals, however, having more journals in the short run will deteriorate the incentives of the
most able authors.
Refereeing Delays Many authors discuss the potential of monetary incentives to de-
crease refereeing delays (Engers and Gans (1998); Chang and Lai (2001)), treating the de-
lays as referees’ leisure. However, refereeing is deeply intertwined with publishing, and
many aspects of it are not contractable. Lowering time delays in a way that worsens the
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quality of referee reports will benefit only less able authors; lowering time delays so that
the quality of refereeing is improved will benefit more able authors—and some of them
will exert more effort—potentially improving the quality distribution of publications.16
Many Referees Obtaining reports of multiple referees provides a better estimate of a
paper’s virtues, but increases the load on the refereeing body, potentially lowering the
quality of the referee reports. Editors can vary the number of referees for each individ-
ual paper, depending on preliminary evaluations: papers sufficiently far away from the
acceptance threshold might get one reviewer to confirm the editor’s preliminary opin-
ion, whereas papers on the verge of the acceptance-threshold can have more reports17,
requested sequentially or simultaneously. The effects on the effort are straightforward:
those authors who expect higher scrutiny—the authors whose papers are more likely to
be perceived as the ones near the threshold—will exercise just enough efforts to be above
the threshold, whereas thosewhose outcome is likely to be determined solely by the editor
are likely to exert more effort.
UsefulRefereesWe limit the involvement of referees by evaluation. Opinions onwhether
referees contribute to the quality of articles vary. If they do, even in a stochastic sense, ref-
erees’ assistance will be most beneficial to those who are below the acceptance threshold.
If referees’ effort is costly, they will only exert it for papers sufficiently close to the accep-
tance threshold. This will lower the effort of authors, since they know that referees will
attempt to “fix” their papers.
Single-, Double- and Triple-Blind Inferring the paper’s quality from the identity or
affiliation of the author might improve the publication process. It is easier to obtain a
signal of equal quality if more information is available ex ante. This, however, is likely to
worsen the stimuli for information acquisition for the referees: if the ex ante signal is very
16One way to achieve the latter is to make it easier to quantify the refereeing impact of a scholar. Admin-
istrators can aggregate information about publications and citations, but not about refereeing engagement.
Some journals provide names of those who provided a referee report in their annual reports; some jour-
nals have an award for the best referee report; some journals employ their best referees as editors. However,
many economists do not put their refereeing contribution into their CV: they think the informational content
of refereeing contribution is not valuable.
17One of the authors is aware of an instance in which 5 referees were employed in a single round.
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persuasive, why spend time on reading the paper? For these reasons, it might or might
not be useful to inform referees about the identity of the author. One could argue one step
further: is it really necessary for the editor to know the authors’ name and affiliation?..
4.2 Job Market Implications
Job market decisions such as hiring involves forming expectations based on fuzzy signals.
References provided by job market candidates are often coming from faculty members of
the PhD program they graduate from. Grades from PhD programs are usually not very
informative. PhD theses are usually unfinished during the job-market season. Having a
publication in a top journal is usually informative but unlikely. What information can the
search committee extract from papers that candidates report as “submitted”?
A submission into a field journal, interpreted as a first submission, could indicate that
the candidate is not of top quality; submission to a less demanding second tier journal is an
even worse signal. However, based on our model, demonstrating a submission to a field
journal might be a better signal than having a submission to a general interest journal: the
submitter to a general interest journal becomes a risky choice for hiring committees, since
both high- and low-ability authors submit to general interest journals.
In a similar spirit, collaboration in authorship of submitted papers is a bad signal if
other signals are favorable, but might be better than having solo submissions if other sig-
nals are unfavorable. Same holds for evidence of hard effort: the highest effort is exercised
by authors near the acceptance threshold, not by those much above. Authors who prefer
to not resubmit their articles after rejection from top journals to less rewarding journals
are probably of intermediate quality.
For very unfortunate references, little can be done to update hiring committee’s be-
liefs towards ability above intermediate, and multiple-authored papers submitted to field
journals could be the best strategy.
These suggestions, obviously, hold only if all candidates are not manipulating submis-
sions to improve their jobmarket chances. If candidates do submit their papers to improve
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their jobmarket chances, does that affect candidates’ publication outcomes in the long run,
especially taking into account tenure decisions?..
4.3 Reinterpretations and Reformulations
The part of the referee’s signal that we label as “noise”might be beneficial if it is ameasure
of the taste of the journal’s readers. The “noise” of accepted papers is more likely to be
positive. For field journals this “noise” can be the field relevance, which might be a part
of the profession’s welfare; in this case, when considering re-submissions, the question
of “noise” correlation across journals is an issue. Even for general interest journals, this
“noise” might be the eloquence of the writing, the ease of presentation, and the clarity of
graphs, which might be beneficial for the profession as well. It can also be the congruence
with the current mainstream, whichmight be less beneficial for the long-run development
of the profession, but satisfying in the short-run. Depending on the benefit of total refer-
ees’ “noise” in published and rejected papers, different outcomes can become attractive.
We did not discuss the complementarity of the authors’ ability and effort. Under com-
plementarity, the quality of submitted paper will still be monotone in ability, and many
results that hinge on that remain. Effort might not decrease with ability anymore, but
many of the results discussed above do not depend on that.
We did not consider author heterogeneity beyond ability and editors’ prior. Some au-
thorsmight have a higher reservation utility as an alternative to publication; these authors
will submit less and spend less effort, since themarginal payoff frompublication is smaller
for them. Some authors might have higher time costs, for instance, authors with looming
career deadlines; these authors are motivated to increase their efforts, but will submit
more papers, which will lower their efforts.
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5 Conclusion
In our study, we supplied a general model of for the publication market. Using it, we
reconciled various stylized facts which characterize differences in Economics over time
and against other disciplines. The main takeaway message of our study is that the het-
erogeneity of authors with regard to their ability leads to different effects of changes in
the publication process’ fundamentals. For one, we explain why able authors are taking
the effectively non-paid refereeing job: they are the ones who benefit from the overall im-
provement of the refereeing technology. The separation of authors into “more able” and
“less able” is endogenous in our model, and it depends on the admission criterion that
the editor applies. Not all separations are monotone: if some authors prefer to submit to
field journal first, even if more valuable general interest journals require the same cutoff,
these authors are likely to be of an intermediate ability. Hence, for many changes in the
fundamentals, there are winners and losers. A claim about an inherent benefit of a change
requires an implicit assumption about the comparative importance of the actors.
Ourmodel does not impose a lot of structure on the underlying institutional processes,
and its predictions can be applied directly to other contexts where agents compete for lim-
ited slots. For instance, job market applicants exert effort to overcome an interviewer’s
expectations regarding acceptable candidates. A model similar to ours will predict in that
context that the most effort will be exerted by applicants marginally below the acceptance
threshold, which in turn has implications on job market search duration. Other contexts
include politicians competing for electorates, start-up businesses pursuing venture fund-
ing for their projects, real estate agents actively pushing their properties, and courtship in
marital market—any context where effort changes perceived quality of a good offered to
another party will inherit the intuition we provide in our model.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1. If there are two solutions to the effort choice problem at θ0, limθ→θ0− < limθ→θ0+.
Proof. Consider Figure 1d: only points A and C can be maxima. Point B is a local min-
imum, because marginal benefit is less than marginal cost on the distance from A to B,
and positive on the distance from B to C. If there are two maxima, it means that the total
benefit of going from A to B is equal to the total loss due to movement from B to C.
The total loss from moving from A to B is decreasing with θ: the lower boundary, the
MB(e) curve, is shifting left, leaving less space in between. The benefit of moving from
B to C, on the other hand, is decreasing: since c′(e) is increasing, the original benefit of
moving from B to C is a subset of the benefit of movement from B to C after the increase
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in θ, and therefore point C becomes more attractive. Thus, an increase in θ cannot lead
to a “jump down”. This immediately extends to the case of multiple intersections ofMB
andMC.
Result 1. The monotonicity of the optimal effort corresponds directly to the monotonicity
of f(·). When the solution of (1) is unique, the proof is immediate from Figures 1b and 1c
(dotted lines show what happens to theMB(e) curve when θ increases). If for some θ op-
timal effort started to decrease with θ, it will be decreasing for θ′ > θ by single-peakedness
of f(·), and for the same reason if for some θ optimal effort increases with θ, it will be in-
creasing for θ′ < θ. Finally, observe that multiple solutions can only happen when one of
the solutions in the domain of the “increasing” part ofMB(e) curve; apply Lemma 1 to fin-
ish the proof. The part about the derivative is obtainable from completely differentiating
(1).
Proposition 1. When the solution of the effort choice problem is unique, we can apply the
implicit function theorem. Differentiate (1) with respect to θ:
−1− δu¯
α2
f ′
(
qˆ − θ − e
α
)(
1 +
de∗(θ)
dθ
)
= c′′(e∗(θ))
de∗(θ)
dθ
.
The derivative of θ + e∗(θ) is
1 +
de∗(θ)
dθ
= 1 +
−1−δu¯
α2
f ′
(
qˆ−θ−e
α
)
c′′(e∗(θ)) + 1−δu¯
α2
f ′
(
qˆ−θ−e
α
) = c′′(e∗(θ))
c′′(e∗(θ)) + 1−δu¯
α2
f ′
(
qˆ−θ−e
α
) .
The denominator is positive because of the second order condition (2), the whole fraction
is positive because c(·) is convex.
Result 2. The change in qˆ ismathematically the same as the change in θ, except that the sign
is reversed. Single-peakedness of effort yields the result. The utility part of the statement
is obtained with the Envelope theorem.
Result 3. Consider first the effects of the changes in δ and u¯ on effort choice and utility.
Since (1) depends on the product of δ and u¯, establishing the result for δwould be sufficient.
Differentiate (1) completely with respect to δ:
− u¯
α
f
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
+
(
1− δu¯
α2
f ′
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
))(
−∂e
∗(θ)
∂δ
)
= c′′(e∗(θ))
∂e∗(θ)
∂δ
⇒
∂e∗(θ)
∂δ
=
− u¯
α
f
(
qˆ−θ−e∗(θ)
α
)
c′′(e∗(θ)) +
1− δu¯
α2
f ′
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 because it’s SOC (2)
< 0.
30
Simultaneously, the Envelope theorem suggests that authors are better off:
∂
∂δ
(
1− [1− δu¯]F
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
− c(e∗(θ))
)
= u¯F
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
∈ [0, 1).
The derivative is equal to zero if and only if u¯ = 0. The paper gets submitted if
1− [1− δu¯]F
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
− c(e∗(θ)) ≥ u¯.
Notice that the right-hand side increases one-to-one with u¯, and does not change with δ.
Since the left-hand side increases slower than one-to-one, the result follows.
Proposition 2. The increase in α “flattens” the distribution (see Figure 2a) similarly to the
way an increase in δ lowered efforts. For a single-peaked f(·), “flattened” distribution
always has two intersections with the original distribution. However, unlike the change
in δ, an increase in α also “stretches” the distribution sideways. When f ′(0) = 0, “flat-
tened” distribution still has the maximum at 0, and two intersections of “before” and “af-
ter” curves are on the opposite sides of the vertical axis. For θ0, the effect of the lowering
level ( 1
α
in front of f(·)) dominates the effort-increasing stretching effect ( 1
α
in the argument
of f(·)); if the original effort was chosen so that q is in the neighborhood of qˆ, the effort
will decrease. Outside this neighborhood, the stretching effect dominates, and the effort
of authors whose ability was much larger or much smaller than in the neighborhood of
qˆ − q ≈ 0 will have to increase (see Figures 2b and 2d).
Take a derivative of the change in the probability of publication with respect to α:(
1− [1− δu¯]F
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
))′
α
= −[1−δu¯]f
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
α(−de∗
dα
(θ))− (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))
α2
.
Solve for de∗
dα
(θ) by totally differentiating (1), and evaluate at α = 1:
d[P (q˜ > qˆ)]
dα
|α=1 =
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[1− δu¯]f (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))
(
de∗
dα
(θ) + qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
)
.
Therefore, the sign of the change in probability is governed by
sgn
d[P (q˜ > qˆ)]
dα
|α=1 = sgn
[
de∗
dα
(θ) + qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
]
= sgn
1
[1−δu¯]c
′′(e∗(θ))− f(qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))
1
[1− δu¯]c
′′(e∗(θ)) + f ′(qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
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When θ is very large or very small, f(qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)) converges to zero, and the sign
of d[P (q˜>qˆ)]
dα
is positive. For θ = θ0, the value of density f(·) is maximal. d[P (q˜>qˆ)]dα will be
negative if [1 − δu¯]f(0) is larger than the second derivative of the effort cost function for
the θ = θ0 author.
The Envelope theorem provides
∂
∂α
(
1− [1− δu¯]F
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
− c(e∗(θ))
)
=
1− δu¯
α2
(qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)) f
(
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
.
Since θ+ e∗(θ) increases in θ, authors with high enough θ will have qˆ− θ− e∗(θ) negative,
rendering the sign of the derivative negative. Reverse holds for small θ authors, for which
qˆ − θ − e∗(θ) > 0.
Result 4. Since F (qˆ− θ− e∗(θ)) decreases in θ, 1− δ+ 2δF (qˆ− θ− e∗(θ))[1− δu¯] decreases
in θ too. Consider the limits:
lim
θ→−∞
1− δ + 2δF (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))[1− δu¯] = 1 + δ − δ2u¯ > 1− δu¯,
lim
θ→+∞
1− δ + 2δF (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))[1− δu¯] = 1− δ < 1− δu¯.
By the intermediate value theorem, there is θˇ where
1− δ + 2δF (qˆ − θˇ − e∗(θˇ))[1− δu¯] = 1− δu¯,
and by the monotonicity of the left-hand side, it is unique. The agent of this type will
choose the same effort level in both worlds, one journal or two journals. For all θ < θˇ,
the marginal benefit of effort has increased: even though getting published at one place
is unlikely, with two journals, the chance of getting accepted somewhere improve. At the
same time, for θ > θˇ, the insurance motive for exercising effort is weaker.
Since F (qˆ − θˇ − e∗(θˇ)) = 1
2
1−u¯
1−δu¯ , the author whose chance of publication is 1/2 will
decrease his effort, as will all authors of higher ability, and some of the authors of ability
lower than that.
Result 5. Assume submitting to journal 2 is better than abstaining:
γ(1− F ) + Fδu¯− c(e) ≥ u¯,
where F = F (qˆ − θ − e) ∈ (0, 1) for some e. Then using same effort provides a higher
utility, if one attempts resubmission to journal 1:
γ(1− F ) + Fδ
>u¯+c(e)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− F + Fδu¯)−c(e) = γ(1− F ) + Fu¯− c(e) ≥ γ(1− F ) + Fδu¯− c(e)u¯.
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Finally, observe that sending first to journal 1 is strictly better:
1−F+Fδ (γ(1− F ) + Fδu¯)−c(e) =
Utility of submitting to 2 first︷ ︸︸ ︷
γ(1− F ) + Fδ (1− F + Fδu)− c(e) +γ(1−F )(1−Fδ).
However, some authors might find it optimal to not resubmit if they get a rejection after
submission to journal 1. Consider θˇ such that
1− Fˇ + Fˇ δu¯− cˇ = u¯,
where cˇ = (e∗(θˇ)), e∗(·) solves (1), and Fˇ = F (qˆ − θˇ − e∗(θˇ)). If this author gets a rejection
from Journal 1, he finds it optimal to resubmit to the second Journal only if
γ(1− Fˇ ) + Fˇ δu¯ ≥ u¯.
Obviously, if γ < u¯, this never holds. When γ > u¯, this inequality, after substitution of
the indifference condition, produces
γ − u¯
γ − δu¯ ≤
1− u¯− cˇ
1− δu¯ ,
which holds if γ ≥ 1−δ+δcˇ
u¯(1−δ)+cˇ u¯. Finally, observe that when γ = 1, all authors resubmit, and
when γ = u¯, no one resubmits. Since the utility of resubmission is continuous in γ, the
threshold γ, established above, has to be above u¯.
Proposition 3. Consider the choice between submitting first to journal 1, then to journal 2
(strategy 1), and submitting first to journal 2, then to journal 1 (strategy 2). Consider the
effort choice problem when choosing strategy i; let e∗i (θ) denote the effort chosen by the
author of type θ.
The utility from submitting to journal 1 first is
U1 = 1−F (qˆ1−θ−e∗1(θ))+F (qˆ1−θ−e∗1(θ)δ (γ(1− F (qˆ2 − θ − e∗1(θ))) + F (qˆ2 − θ − e∗1(θ))δu¯)−c(e∗1(θ)).
The utility from submitting to journal 2 first is
U2 = γ(1−F (qˆ2−θ−e∗2(θ)))+F (qˆ2−θ−e∗2(θ)δ (1− F (qˆ1 − θ − e∗2(θ)) + F (qˆ1 − θ − e∗2(θ))δu¯)−c(e∗2(θ)).
When γ = 1 and qˆ2 = qˆ1, e∗1(θ) = e∗2(θ) = e∗(θ), and U1(θ) = U2(θ). Consider a small
change in γ at γ = 1 and qˆ1 = qˆ2 = qˆ:
dU1
dγ
= δF (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))(1− F (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))) > 0.
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dU2
dγ
= 1− F (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)) > 0.
As in Result 5, lowering γ makes submitting to journal 2 first a strictly dominated strategy
for every ability level:
d(U1 − U2)
dγ
= (1− F (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))) (δF (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))− 1) < 0.
Consider a small change in qˆ2, the admission standard of journal 2:
dU1
dqˆ2
= δF (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))(δu¯− 1)f(qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)) < 0.
dU2
dqˆ2
= (δ [1− F (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)) + F (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))δu¯]− 1)f(qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)) < 0.
Lowering qˆ2 makes submitting to journal 1 first a strictly dominated strategy:
d(U1 − U2)
dqˆ2
= f(qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))[1− δ] > 0.
To model a simultaneous decrease in qˆ2 and γ, express the relative change in γ with λ ∈
(0, 1), and consider
λ
−d(U1 − U2)
dγ
+ (1− λ)−d(U1 − U2)
dqˆ2
= λ(1− F (·))(1− δF (·))− (1− λ)f(·)[1− δ].
Strategy 1 is better than strategy 2 if it is positive:
[1− δ]1− λ
λ
<
1− F (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))
f(qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)) [1− δF (qˆ − θ − e
∗(θ))].
By log-concavity of f(·), [1− F (·)]/f(·) is decreasing. The product of two decreasing pos-
itive functions is decreasing, and therefore the inequality above holds for small enough
q−θ−e∗(θ). By monotonicity of θ+e∗(θ), these are authors with large enough θ, they will
submit to journal 1 first, and the rest will submit to journal 2 first.
Proposition 4. See Figure 3 for illustration. Consider the choice between submitting first to
general interest journal, then to field (strategy 1), versus submitting to field journal, then
to general interest (strategy 2). Consider the effort choice problemwhen choosing strategy
i; let e∗i (θ) denote the effort chosen by the author of type θ.
The utility from submitting to journal 1 first is
U1 = 1−F (qˆ−θ−e∗1(θ))+F (qˆ−θ−e∗1(θ)δ
(
γ(1− F ( qˆ − θ − e
∗
1(θ)
α
)) + F (
qˆ − θ − e∗1(θ)
α
)δu¯
)
−c(e∗1(θ)).
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The utility from submitting to journal 2 first is
U2 = γ(
1− F (qˆ − θ − e∗2(θ)
α
)+F (
qˆ − θ − e∗2(θ)
α
)δ (1− F (qˆ − θ − e∗2(θ))) + F (qˆ − θ − e∗2(θ))δu¯)−c(e∗2(θ)).
Assume γ = 1 and α = 1, then e∗1(θ) = e∗2(θ) = e∗(θ), and both submission strategies are
equally attractive. Consider the difference of the utility from the first submission strategy
and the utility from the second submission strategy. Take a derivative with respect to α:
d
dα
(U1 − U2)|α=1 = δu¯ [qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)] f(qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))[1− F (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))].
Since θ + e∗(θ) is increasing, the sign of [qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)] determines the sign of the whole
expression. When θ is large enough, the whole expression is negative: able authors prefer
submitting to a field journal.
Consider now a change in γ:
d
dγ
(U1 − U2)|γ=1 = −(1− F (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ)))2.
To model the simultaneous decrease in α and γ, express the relative change in γ with
λ ∈ (0, 1), and consider
λ
−d
dγ
(U1 − U2) + (1− λ)−d
dα
(U1 − U2)|α=γ=1 = λ(1− F (x))2 + (1− λ)δu¯xf(x)[1− F (x)],
where x = qˆ − θ − e(θ). Authors of positive x (that is, with θ + e∗(θ) < qˆ) will prefer to
pursue strategy 1 for every λ.
Take x¯ < 0, and pick λ < λ¯, where
λ¯ =
δu¯x¯f(x¯0)
δu¯x¯f(x¯) + 1− F (x¯) .
For this λ, agents in the neighborhood of x¯ prefer strategy 2. On the other hand, as
x→ −∞ (that is, as θ → +∞),
λ
−d
dγ
(U1 − U2) + (1− λ)−d
dα
(U1 − U2)|α=γ=1 → λ,
since xf(x) converges to zero at the extremes, so that ε can have a finite mean. Therefore,
for every λ > 0, most able authors prefer submitting to the general interest journals.
Result 6. Compare (1) and (3). Observe that c′(2e) > c′(e), and therefore the per-paper
effort has to be lower.
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To calculate the total effort, denote E = 2e. Rewrite (3) as
[1− δu¯]f(qˆ − θ − E/2) = c′(E). (3’)
The right-hand sides of (1) and (3’) coincide.
For single-peaked f(·), the nonzero intersection of f(qˆ − θ − e) and f(qˆ − θ − e/2) is
unique, denote it e¯(θ). It is positive for small θ. Observe that e¯(θ) decreases with θ until
hits zero. If e¯(θ) > e∗(θ), because of single-peakedness of f , it has to be that e∗2(θ) < e∗(θ),
and vice versa.
Result 7. Consider first the case of γ = 1. By convexity of c(·), 2c(e/2) < c(e), and d
de
2c(e/2) =
c′(e/2) < c′(e) = d
de
2c(e/2). The marginal benefits of effort for collaborators and for solo
authors are the same. At e∗(θ), however, collaborators have smallermarginal costs of effort
than marginal benefits, hence e∗∗(θ) > e∗(θ) when γ is 1. The Envelope theorem provides
the second part of the Result.
Result 8. In collaboration, the marginal costs of effort are smaller. For large θ, this cor-
responds to Figure 5a. The total effort becomes higher, but since the marginal benefit of
effort in collaboration is lower, per-person effort is lower. For small θ, the relevant por-
tion of f(·) is depicted on Figure 5b. Since the marginal benefit is locally increasing, the
marginal benefit of effort in collaboration might be higher than if coauthors worked sepa-
rately, hence the per-person effort is higher. Because the density is single-peaked, and c′(e)
is increasing, there is a threshold θ¯ whereMB(e∗(θ)|θ) < MB(e∗∗(θ)|θ) for all θ < θ¯.
Result 9. Observe that e∗∗(θ) is characterized by
[1− δu¯]f(qˆ − θ − e∗∗(θ)) = 1
γ
c′(e∗∗(θ)/2).
One can always pick γ = γ¯ > 0 that provides
1
γ¯
c′(e∗∗(θ)/2) = c′(e∗(θ)).
For γ = γ¯, the probability of publication solo is equal to probability of publication together,
but the payoff from publication is only γ. Hence, publishing solo is strictly preferable.
Smaller γ lowers the payoff from coauthoring, but not from publishing solo.
Result 10. DenoteMB(e|θ) = [1− δu¯]f(qˆ − θ − e). Observe that e∗(θ) is characterized by
MB(e∗(θ)|θ) = c′(e∗(θ)),
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and e∗∗(θ) is characterized by
MB(e∗∗(θ)|θ) = 1/γc′(e∗∗(θ)/2).
As θ → 0, the effort chosen by both ways converges to zero becauseMB(e|θ)→θ→−∞ 0. θ,
however, does not change the cost part of the effort choice. In the neighborhood of e = 0,
d
de
(
1
γ
c′(e/2)
)
|e=0 = 1
2γ
c′′(0),
which is larger than c′′(0) = d
de
(c′(e)) |e=0 if and only if γ > 1/2. Therefore, when γ > 1/2,
the collaborative total effort e∗∗(·) of very lowly able authors is higher than the solo effort
e∗(·) of the same authors, and reverse holds if γ < 1/2.
The difference between utilities of collaboration and of solo submission is:
[γ (1− [1− δu¯]F (qˆ − θ − e∗∗(θ))− c(e∗∗(θ)/2)]− [(1− [1− δu¯]F (qˆ − θ − e∗(θ))− c(e∗(θ))] .
The derivative of this with respect to θ, applying the Envelope theorem twice, and using
FOCs to replace f(·) with c′(·), is
γ[1−δu¯]f(qˆ−θ−e∗∗(θ)−[1−δu¯]f(qˆ−θ−e∗(θ)) = c′(e∗∗(θ)/2)−c′(e∗(θ)) < c′(e∗∗(θ))−c′(e∗(θ)).
Since c′(·) is an increasing function, when γ < 1/2, the difference between the utility
of collaboration and the utility of the solo submission is decreasing. Since the utilities of
collaboration and solo writing approach 0 as θ → −∞, the value of this difference is zero
in the limit. Therefore, this difference is negative for small enough θ. It means that the
values of these utilities are ordered in a very specific way for small enough θ: the utility of
solo submission is higher than the utility of coauthorship.
B Proofs and Robustness Checks Not For Publication
Cutoff rule for editor. Assume the editor chooses between papers whose signals are q˜1 and
q˜2. The editor estimates the probability that paper 1 is better than paper 2:
P (q1 > q2) = P (q˜1 − αε1 > q˜2 − αε2) = P (ε1 − ε2 < (q˜1 − q˜2)/α).
Since ε1 − ε2 is distributed symmetrically, the probability that paper 1 is better than
paper 2 is bigger than 1/2 if and only if q˜1 > q˜2. The result extends to scenarios where the
referees’ noise is not additive and homoskedastic if the distribution of q˜i conditional on qi
features the MLRP property.
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Cutoff rule for the authors. Apply the Envelope Theorem to the effort choice problem know-
ing that the editor will apply a cutoff rule: the utility of publishing is increasing in θ.
Equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Consider the best responses of the editor (admission
rule decision) and of the authors (participation decision). The increase in θˆ lowers the
submissions without the change in effort of those who submit. Therefore, less than T of
papers produce the signal of qˆ, and therefore the best response function qˆ(θˆ) is a decreasing
function. Simultaneously, an increase in qˆ lowers the utility of submitters by the Envelope
theorem; therefore, θˆ increases in qˆ, and the inverse function is increasing aswell. So, in the
space of (θˆ, qˆ), one best response is decreasing, and another is increasing. The intersection
is unique. The existence is straightforward.
Effort is well-defined. Since the payoff is bounded, concavity of the cost function guarantees
that the effort is finite. Indeed, consider e′ > 0: if c(e′) > 1, the optimal effort needs to be
less than e′, and Berge’s theorem applies. If not, consider e′′ = e′ + 1−c(e
′)
c′(e′) : by concavity of
c(·), c(e′′) ≥ 1, with equality only if c(·) is linear in [e′, e′′]. Therefore, the optimal level of
effort is bounded by e′′, and Berge’s theorem applies.
Effort is generally single-valued. Assume that at θ′, e∗(θ′) has two solutions. This means that
theMB andMC curves intersect thrice, like on the Figure 1d (pointB is a localminimum),
and the area contained between two curves in the interval e ∈ [A,B] (where marginal
benefit is smaller than marginal cost) is equal to the area contained between two curves in
the interval e ∈ [B,C] (where marginal benefit is larger than marginal cost), and therefore
the expected payoff when e is chosen at the point of A is the same as the effort chosen at
the point ofC. A small increase in θ shifts theMB curve to the left. That increases the area
betweenMB andMC curves from B to C (whereMB is larger thanMC), and decreases
the area between A and B, showing that there is a higher expected payoff from being in
point C compared to being in point A. Similarly, one can show that a small decrease in
θ leads to choosing A. Therefore, in a small enough punctured neighborhood of θ′, e∗(θ)
is single-valued, and therefore (by the lack of atoms in the distribution of f(·)) the set of
θ where e∗(θ) is two-valued has measure zero. The argument immediately generalizes to
multiple-valued e∗(θ).
For two journals of same payoff and standard, authors submit to both journals sequentially. The re-
sult follows since the author knows the quality of his paper for sure, and does not learn
from the rejection. Assume submitting once for evaluation is reasonable:
1− F + Fδu¯− c(e) ≥ u¯,
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where F = F (qˆ − θ − e) for some e. Then, for the same effort,
1− F + Fδ
≥u¯+c(e)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− F + Fδu¯)−c(e) > 1− F + Fδu¯− c(e) ≥ u¯.
Proposition 1 persists with two journals. In a way similar to the proof in Proposition 1,
1+
∂e∗(θ)
∂θ
=
c′′(e∗(θ))
c′′(e∗(θ)) + (1− δ) f ′ (qˆ − q) + 2δ(1− δu¯) (F (qˆ − q)f ′(qˆ − q)− f 2(qˆ − q))) > 0.
where q = θ + e∗(θ).
Robustness of results to additivity. For production function, we assumed that q = θ + e. If
instead we assumed that q = θe, we can take logs, and formulate our model in terms of
q′ = ln q, θ′ = ln θ, e′ = ln e⇒ q′ = θ′ + e′.
Properties like single-peakedness of the density and cutoff strategies remain under cutoff
transformation. c(exp(e′)) is convex as long as c(·) is convex.
For CES aggregation q = (θκ + eκ)1/κ, one can substitute
q′ = qκ, θ′ = θκ, e′ = eκ ⇒ q′ = θ′ + e′.
For κ > 0, same logic applies. For κ < 0, it is harder to retain convexity of the transformed
cost function, but it is evident that the space where results persevere remains non-trivial.
If θ instead of increasing the endowment of the paper qualitywas lowering themarginal
costs of effort, and q = e (or an increasing function of it), one can easily establish that un-
der single-peakedness of ε, e increases with θ, which makes Proposition 1 easier to obtain.
Since it is key to proofs of other results, it is likely that they survive as well (Proposition 2
survives for sure).
For a general endowment-effort aggregation, q(θ, e), Proposition 1 remains as long as
an increase in θ does not decrease the marginal quality of effort application. This is a
common (single-crossing) assumption in the literature.
For refereeing noise additivity, CES or Cobb-Douglas specification allows to revert to
the additive structure: q˜ = (θκ + eκ + εκ)1/κ ⇒
q˜′ = qκ, θ′ = θκ, e′ = eκ, ε′ = εκ ⇒ q˜′ = θ′ + e′ + ε′.
Single-peakedness of the density remains if the transformation ismonotone, log-concavity
is harder to preserve.
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Two good journals are sufficient to study N journals. Assume that a publication in journal i
yields γi unit of utility to an author. The author considers submitting his paper to journals
S ∪ {i, j}. The expected payoff of an author who submits to journal i first, to journal j
afterwards, and then follows the optimal submission plan, is then
γi(1− Fi) + Fiδ (γj (1− Fj)) + FiFjδ2U(S)− c(e),
where Fi = F ( qˆi−θ−eαi ), and U(S) is the utility from submitting the paper to journals in the
set S. Alternatively, journal j can be chosen as a first choice option:
γj(1− Fj) + Fjδ (γi (1− Fi)) + FiFjδ2U(S)− c(e).
For every level of chosen effort, the first journal is preferable when the difference of the
former payoff from the latter payoff is positive:
γi(1− Fi) + Fiδ (γj (1− Fj)) > γj(1− Fj) + Fjδ (γi (1− Fi))⇒ γi 1− Fi
1− δFi > γj
1− Fj
1− δFj .
Observe that U(S) or S do not affect the choice in the ordering. For every submission
sequence, either it is ordered by the ratio of the expected payoff to 1− δP (reject), or it can
be improved18. For instance, in our two-good-one-bad journal case, submitting to journal
2 is better than sending off to a bad journal when
γ
1− F2
1− δF2 > u¯
1
1− δ ,
giving rise to Result 5 and Proposition 3.
18This is thewayHeintzelman andNocetti (2009) adaptsWeitzman (1979) argument on the optimal search
sequence.
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